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Moral Perception, by Robert Audi. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013. Pp. xii + 180
A common thought is that perception’s epistemic role in ethics is limited to providing subjects with 
information about non-moral (though morally relevant) facts. In his Moral Perception, Robert Audi 
sets out to argue, against this, that ordinary subjects can sometimes be said to perceive the moral 
qualities of actions and individuals, and that moral perception can directly ground moral 
knowledge. Audi’s is the first  book-length treatment of the topic, and is further distinguished by its 
placing the discussion of moral perception in the context of a comprehensive epistemology and 
philosophy of mind. It is a rich and thought-provoking work which will engage philosophers from a 
variety of areas.
Space constraints necessitate a relatively  narrow discussion. I will be restricted to briefly 
summarising and commenting upon Audi’s account of moral perception, including the more direct 
connections between this and his theories of intuition, moral concepts and emotion. In doing so I 
am neglecting much valuable material, notably, discussion of the epistemology of moral 
disagreement (Chapter 4), an illuminating comparison of the metaphysics and epistemology of 
ethics and aesthetics (Chapter 5), and some interesting work on the epistemic and psychological 
interactions between emotion, intuition, and imagination (Chapters 6 and 7). Readers are 
recommended to consult this for themselves.
In Chapter 1, Audi presents a causal and representational theory of perception. Roughly, for a 
subject to perceive an object is for the object to instantiate some set of properties, which in turn 
‘produces or sustains, in the right way, an appropriate phenomenal representation’ (p. 20) of those 
properties in the subject. On this view, subjects see worldly  objects by  seeing a subset of their 
properties. 
To accommodate moral perception, in Chapters 2 and 3 Audi supplements this account. Unlike the 
perception of the physical properties of everyday objects, Audi claims that ‘no sensory  phenomenal 
representation is possible’ for moral properties (p. 33). What is sensory phenomenal representation? 
Audi characterises this as ‘cartographic or even pictorial’ representation – primarily associated with 
vision – involving a ‘mapping’ from phenomenal properties to physical properties of objects (p. 37). 
All is not lost, however, since Audi thinks the scope of the ‘perceptible’ (pp. 34-38) outstrips that 
which can be sensorially  represented; there can be perception of moral properties even if the 
representation is non-sensorial or non-cartographic. Unfortunately, Audi doesn’t offer a precise 
characterisation of non-sensorial representation. 
With this distinction made, one might have expected Audi to proceed to argue that moral properties 
can be non-sensorially  represented in perceptual experience (perhaps with the caveat that moral 
properties are not themselves causal). In doing so he might have appealed to arguments found in the 
philosophy of perception literature supporting the thesis that high-level properties, such as natural 
kinds, can be represented in perceptual experience (see, e.g., the method of phenomenal contrast in 
Siegel, S. The Contents of Visual Experience, Oxford: OUP, 2010). 
However, Audi doesn’t take this approach. Instead, he presents what I am calling the Integration 
Model of moral perception (‘Integration’ for short). This involves what he calls the phenomenal 
integration (pp. 38-39) of a perception of non-moral base properties (upon which some moral 
property, e.g., wrongness, is consequential) and some moral ‘experiential’ or ‘phenomenal’ element, 
such as ‘a phenomenal sense – which may, but need not, be emotional – of the moral character of 
the act’ (p. 40), an ‘intuitive sense of wrongdoing’ (p. 43), a nonconceptual ‘sense of 
unfittingness’ (p. 46), or a ‘perceptual moral seeming’ (p. 46). Three things to note: firstly, this list 
is not  exhaustive and may simply involve elaborations of what Audi regards as a single 
phenomenon: moral phenomenal sensing. Second, Audi suggests that the integration may be partly 
constituted by a ‘felt  sense of connection’ (p. 39) between the components. Finally, Audi thinks he 
can accommodate the apparently  causal nature of perception since moral phenomenal elements are 
‘causally explainable in terms of their basis in the [sensory representation of] natural properties on 
which moral properties are consequential’ (p. 55). Altogether this apparently yields something 
worth calling moral perception. 
However, without further elaboration, one might doubt that Integration delivers an account of full-
blooded moral perception. On one understanding of Integration (as presented by Audi), moral 
perception at best involves the sensory representation of non-moral base properties, integrated with 
an ostensibly non-perceptual moral phenomenal experience. Although these experiences may be 
integrated such that we can speak of one overall moral experience, this is an overall experience of 
which perception – non-moral perception – is only a component. Indeed, on this interpretation, were 
Integration to be parachuted into debates about the existence of high-level perception, it would 
likely be considered a counter-hypothesis to the claim that there is bona fide moral perception. 
Assuming this interpretation, Audi may respond as follows: since Integration involves a moral 
phenomenal element and an overall experience capable of conferring non-inferential justification 
for moral belief, we are entitled to call it moral perception. To support this point, he might draw a 
contrast between Integration and an Inferentialist view that most – including Audi (p. 52) – would 
regard as falling short of moral perception: we perceive non-moral facts and then infer (perhaps 
implicitly  and psychologically immediately) a moral belief from this perception together with at 
least one background moral belief. With Inferentialism we lack the experiential element and 
immediate justification many associate with perception. Integration, on the other hand, does possess 
these features. 
There are, however, two things worth noting that make the contrast between Integration and 
Inferentialism less stark: firstly, an Inferentialist might accommodate the supposedly necessary 
phenomenal element of moral perception by claiming that epistemically inferential moral perceptual 
judgments have an associated phenomenology, and can themselves be integrated with non-moral 
perception. Secondly, and more importantly, although Integration may deliver non-inferential 
justification, it does not appear to be purely  perceptual justification. Indeed, with Integration, moral 
perceptual belief appears epistemically dependent  on ostensibly non-perceptual sources, i.e., moral 
phenomenal sensing. This arguably makes it epistemically similar to moral beliefs as conceived on 
Inferentialism. 
To develop this epistemological point  further, consider what appears to be Audi’s considered view 
on why we should think that moral perception is epistemically  reliable. Roughly, someone who has 
an adequate grasp  of a moral concept, e.g., MORAL WRONGNESS, will have dispositions to have 
appropriate moral phenomenal responses (of the sort involved in Integration, however we 
understand it) upon perceptually  apprehending non-moral base properties in particular moral 
scenarios (see, especially, pp. 101-2 and p. 118). The relevant point of interest here is that the 
epistemic credentials of moral phenomenal responses are plausibly  derivative of subject’s grasping 
ostensibly  synthetic a priori entailments between moral properties and their non-moral grounds, 
which will presumably be a non-empirical matter. Hence, if we assume Audi’s considered view, 
moral perceptual knowledge looks to be crucially dependent upon substantive non-empirical 
knowledge. 
Audi might respond by claiming that the knowledge of the entailments between moral properties 
and their non-moral grounds is empirical, in which case the worry about non-empirical knowledge 
dissipates. Note, however, that this might lead to a different problem: if empirical knowledge of 
these entailments is inferential then this would suggest that moral perceptual knowledge is, 
ultimately, a sort of inferential knowledge which is at odds with the sort of intuitionist position Audi 
wants to defend.
At this stage, we should perhaps consider whether there is an alternative way of construing 
Integration such that it  yields experiences that (i) are less tenuously  perceptual, and relatedly, (ii) 
aren’t epistemically  dependent on non-empirical sources. The suggestion I have in mind is that what 
Audi calls ‘Integration’ be understood as akin to what philosophers of perception call cognitive 
penetration (see, e.g., Macpherson, F. ‘Cognitive Penetration of Colour Experience: Rethinking the 
Issue in Light of An Indirect Mechanism’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1): 
24-62, 2012): very roughly, the modification of perceptual representational content by states in the 
subject’s cognitive system, where this can include, e.g., beliefs, desires, emotions, and intuitions. 
Nothing that Audi says in Moral Perception rules out this interpretation (see, especially, fn 7 on p. 
16 - thanks to Pekka Vayrynen for pointing this out to me). On this view, Integration involves moral 
phenomenal sensing modifying the representational content of the non-moral perceptual experience. 
This needn’t involve sensory representation, but would involve perception coming to phenomenally 
represent moral properties, which is arguably the sort of thing we are looking for.
Note, however, that opting for this model requires that reasons be provided for thinking that 
cognitive penetration of this sort occurs, and that moral properties are admissible contents of 
perceptual experience. It would have aided Audi’s argument in Moral Perception had he engaged 
with the growing literature on these topics (one might raise a similar point  about Audi’s discussion 
of emotion (Ch. 6), where he neglects to discuss some key positions in the philosophy  of emotion 
which are relevant to his overall position, e.g., Peter Goldie’s feeling towards view of affective 
intentionality (see The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration, Oxford: OUP, 2000) and Michael 
Brady’s account (Emotional Insight, Oxford: OUP, 2013) of the epistemic role of emotion as 
promoting the discovery of reasons). Audi only speaks to these sorts of issues when he says: ‘I see 
no good reason not to speak of moral perception if we can speak of facial perception and perception 
of anger’ (p. 59). However, as far as I can tell, Audi doesn’t provide reasons for thinking that, e.g., 
anger, is an admissible content of perceptual experience, and it is anyway unclear what support  this 
would provide for the claim that moral properties can be perceptually represented.
Suppose, however, that we do adopt this more robustly  perceptual interpretation of Integration. 
Does it  avoid non-empirical epistemic dependence? On this model of Integration, moral perception 
is causally dependent on moral phenomenal sensing. However, there is arguably a good case to be 
made for thinking that, so characterised, moral perception may also be epistemically  dependent on 
the epistemic status of the penetrating states (see, e.g., Cowan, R., ‘Perceptual Intuitionism’, 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1), 2013). The upshot: even if moral perception 
non-inferentially  justifies, it may still be dependent on non-empirical sources (in the way described 
above). 
This isn’t  really  a criticism of Audi’s overall position as much as it  is a caveat: those coming to 
Moral Perception looking for an account  clearly free of a commitment to non-empirical epistemic 
sources should be left disappointed. However, this need not and should not deter anyone from 
reading what is both an important extension of Audi’s metaethical position and a highly  valuable 
contribution to the moral epistemology literature more generally.
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